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AbstrAct
Objectives To evaluate the new model of providing care 
based on demand. This included reconfiguration of the 
workforce to manage workforce supply challenges and 
meet demand without compromising the quality of care.
Design Currently the Sports Ground Safety Authority 
recommends the provision of crowd medical cover at 
English Football League stadia. The guidance on provision 
of services has focused on extreme circumstances such 
as the Hillsborough disaster in 1989, while the majority 
of demand on present-day services is from patients with 
minor injuries, exacerbations of injuries and pre-existing 
conditions. A new model of care was introduced in the 
2009/2010 season to better meet demand. A realist 
approach was taken. Data on each episode of care were 
collected over 14 consecutive football league seasons at 
Millwall FC divided into two periods, preimplementation 
of changes and postimplementation of changes. Data on 
workforce retention and volunteer satisfaction were also 
collected.
setting The data were obtained from one professional 
football league team (Millwall FC) located in London, UK.
Primary and secondary outcomes The primary outcome 
was to examine the demand for crowd medical services. 
The secondary outcome was to remodel the service to 
meet these demands.
results In total, 981 episodes of care were recorded over 
the evaluation period of 14 years. The groups presenting, 
demographic and type of presentation did not change 
over the evaluation. First aiders were involved in 87.7% 
of episodes of care, nurses in 44.4% and doctors 17.8%. 
There was a downward trend in referrals to hospital. 
Workforce feedback was positive.
conclusions The new workforce model has met 
increased service demands while reducing the number of 
referrals to acute care. It involves the first aid workforce in 
more complex care and key decision-making and provides 
a flexible registered healthcare professional team to 
optimise the skill mix of the team.
IntrODuctIOn
Crowd medical services in the English Foot-
ball League were formalised by the recom-
mendations of Lord Justice Taylor1 following 
an incident at Hillsborough Stadium, in 
which 96 spectators died in 1989, and the 
subsequent findings of the enquiries which 
have been ongoing. In 2012, the inquest into 
the deaths at Hillsborough was reopened.
After the recommendations of the Taylor 
Report1 and previous legislation,2–4 the 
current Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds5 
was published. This guidance is often referred 
to as the Green Guide. It is not statute but 
incorporates many of the acts that relate to 
crowd safety within sports stadia in England.
The workforce provision in the guide is for 
one first aider per thousand spectators, and 
where a crowd is expected to exceed 2000 a 
crowd doctor who is trained in immediate care 
should be provided. A first aider is defined as 
an individual holding a first aid certificate, 
in England they are not usually a health-
care professional, but a lay person with skills 
such as immediate treatment of bleeding, 
minor injuries and basic life support. Ambu-
lance provision is included in the guidelines 
with crowds between 5000 and up to 25 000 
requiring ambulance with paramedic crew. 
Statutory ambulance provision increases 
with crowds between 25 000 and 40 000 and 
again >40 000.6 Despite a thorough search 
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Research
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The study monitored crowd medical services over a 
14-year period.
 ► The study demonstrates that the demand for 
crowd medical services is more varied than 
the requirements of the ‘Green Guide’ and that 
remodelling of the service was necessary.
 ► The workforce responded positively to the changes 
made to the service.
 ► The study was limited by incomplete data collection 
in the early years of the study and as it was carried 
out at a single football league team.
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of the literature, no evidence for these ratios or educa-
tional standards has been found and it appears they were 
arrived at by consensus at the time.
The Hillsborough disaster influenced much of the 
framework for the guidance of provision of crowd 
medical services in league football over the next 25 years 
and for good reason. Lack of triage and immediate scene 
management by the ambulance service caused or contrib-
uted to the loss of lives by failing to recognise or actuate a 
major incident.7 Subsequently, the guidance on provision 
of services has focused on extreme circumstances such as 
mass casualty situations and physical environments such 
as all standing crowds, which largely no longer exist in 
the football league. This has meant that guidance for 
the design of medical service provision is led by a ‘black 
swan’, a rare event with extreme impact and retrospec-
tive predictability8 while the majority of demand is given a 
lesser priority and resource but is a far more likely to have 
a greater impact on the service.9–11
The demand on services in present-day spectator care 
is rarely from major mass casualty situations. Commonly, 
demand is from patients with minor injuries, exacerba-
tions of illness, pre-existing conditions and occasionally 
emergent patients.9–12 Designing a service model that 
can accommodate both immediate disaster management 
but also the higher volume of minor injuries, medical 
emergencies and primary care work presents a different 
challenge to that designed into national guidance such 
as the Green Guide’. In recent years, austerity measures 
in England have also placed resource constraints on 
healthcare service providers such as the statutory ambu-
lance service and the acute sector.13 Managing demand at 
source has become a fundamental necessity.
Millwall’s ground, The Den, was built in 1993 as part 
of the post-Taylor initiative14 with a capacity of 20 146. 
The club is currently located between two inner London 
boroughs, Lewisham and Southwark. Residents are more 
likely to die an early death through cancer, heart disease 
or smoking-related illnesses, and in Lewisham have a life 
expectancy 6.8 years lower than the England average.15
Planning the medical services for mass gatherings is 
difficult. The number of variables is complex and their 
interactions dynamic.16 17 In order to manage demand 
in an effective and sustainable way, the service at Millwall 
was reviewed based on the previous set of demand and 
outcome data.9 Concurrently supply of workforce was 
examined, and a number of local issues were revealed.
Problem description and rationale for change
A retrospective study had already been carried out,9 and 
this identified that the majority of local demand is from 
non-mass casualty situations such as exacerbations of 
chronic disease, minor injuries and much less commonly, 
emergent patients. The statutory requirement to have 
ambulance vehicles on site was becoming more chal-
lenging due to issues with availability of crews and on 
occasions it was not possible to meet this requirement. 
This also applied to recruiting individuals to fill the 
‘crowd doctor’ role as changes in training in England has 
impacted on the availability of supply. Doctors with appro-
priate training in immediate care and also able to commit 
to regular rotas proved difficult. Some authors recom-
mend this level of care becomes a prehospital speciality18 
which would present even more challenges in terms of 
supply. Times of high demand and the working environ-
ment demonstrated that skills and attributes beyond tech-
nical competency were required and that this particularly 
applied to the ‘crowd doctor’ role. The only requirement 
to become a ‘crowd doctor’ was to have General Medical 
Council registration and completion of a 2.5-day Football 
Association Faculty of Pre-hospital Care Crowd Doctor 
course, but extreme situations at Millwall demonstrated 
that this was not sufficient preparation for the role.
Staff turnover was high and inconsistent due to the 
employment model of ad hoc sessional work. This leads 
to little team cohesiveness as members worked together 
infrequently and were not familiar with local working 
conditions.
Since the publication of the Taylor Report almost 30 
years ago, a number of other professional groups such 
as nurses, paramedics and physiotherapists practice at a 
much more complex level incorporating advanced prac-
tice skills19 which were not used in the service to any great 
degree. A re-examination of local data indicated that the 
default of the first-line treatment by first aiders had a low 
referral threshold to acute emergency care when it might 
not be clinically necessary if a healthcare professional was 
available for advice or review. These findings echo those 
of Kemp in other event medical services.12 Despite the 
presence of the statutory ambulance service at games, 
the Green Guide stipulated this was for major incident 
use only. In addition to statutory ambulance provision, 
a vehicle was also provided by a voluntary service agency, 
St John Ambulance (SJA). SJA increasingly had difficulty 
providing ambulance cover for games due to a limited 
supply of volunteers qualified to do this work.
These challenges required a pragmatic response in 
terms of service redesign and workforce supply in order 
to manage risk and use the limited resources more effec-
tively. There is evidence to show that high-performing 
teams and high-reliability organisations20 have certain 
attributes, and alongside remodelling the service and 
workforce supply an approach to examining team 
makeup was also undertaken.
Examining the teams’ effectiveness using the work of 
Michael West21 22 revealed a level of high-task reflexivity. 
The teams were technically focused but the unstable 
and temporary working patterns characteristic of these 
services meant a lower-level social reflexivity. This meant 
a focus on the technical task and less awareness of the 
situation or of team member’s needs. The professionally 
qualified members of the team such as doctors and para-
medics were engaged on a per game basis, meaning very 
high levels of turnover and unfamiliarity with working 
practices and the environment. This has on occasions 
caused serious issues, for example, a major incident in 
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200223 in which the clinical leadership, who were tran-
sient, were unsure of their roles despite being qualified 
to the standard of the then Football Licencing Authority 
Green Guide.5
The transient workforce also meant limited profes-
sional support was given to the more stable volunteer 
workforce of first aiders, for example, supporting them to 
use evidence-based practice in areas such as wound care, 
medicines management, assessment of traumatic injury 
and infection control.
specific aims
 ► to reconfigure the workforce to manage workforce 
supply challenges and yet meet demand without 
compromising the quality of care;
 ► to provide capacity and increase activity in other areas 
such as health promotion.
MethODs
A medical advisory group of stakeholders (including 
supporters) was convened to consider all challenges and 
possible solutions. This group then reported to the over-
arching Safety Advisory Group which is led by the local 
authority who grants the safety licence without which the 
stadium cannot open to the public.
A quality improvement approach was taken. A defining 
characteristic of quality improvement projects is that they 
are established primarily as improvement activities rather 
than research. The principal aim of a quality improve-
ment project is to secure positive change in an identified 
service.24 The format taken was an iterative one using the 
Plan, Do, Study, Act cycle over seven seasons.
After the assessment of the challenges, the response 
was to undertake a planned implementation of several 
interventions providing they were approved by the Safety 
Advisory Group.
The overall approach to change was adoption of 
Safety II principles25 focusing on what works well within 
the stakeholder group. The evaluation used a realist 
evaluation framework26 27 using primarily longitudinal 
observational data to look at context and outcomes but 
within the mechanism of social change. Realist evalua-
tion is helpful in this kind of project as it is inductive 
rather than reductive and method agnostic allowing 
for the narrative synthesis of the different types of data 
generated and suited to a local study within a specific 
context.
Interventions
After historical data were examined to assess demand and 
the assessment of team reflexivity had been undertaken, 
several interventions were implemented and are shown 
in figure 1A.
The workforce changes included formalising a medical 
coordinator role (a consistent leadership position account-
able to the safety officer), discontinuation of the ‘crowd 
doctor’ role and subsequent employment of a multidis-
ciplinary team of physicians and nurse practitioners with 
prehospital qualifications and the skills and attributes to 
meet the demand.
The medical coordinator is the accountable officer 
reporting directly to the safety officer. The responsibil-
ities include ensuring staffing and equipment require-
ments are met, overseeing the medical plan, liaising with 
the stakeholders, clinical audit and leadership on match 
days.
A non-hierarchical structure using the formation of 
a self-organised team that decides its own workflow was 
agreed alongside ‘red rules’ to maintain safety.28 Red 
rules are safety rules which must never be broken and are 
commonly used in other safety-critical workforces. This 
resulted in devolved front-line decision-making that could 
be supported with further technical skill or clinical acumen 
if required. A fundamental aspect of these changes was 
inclusion of the voluntary first aid workforce in strategic 
decision-making which they had not been involved in 
before despite being the main provider of care.
Support from a more consistent healthcare profes-
sional workforce enabled evidence-based practice to be 
introduced across the service including within the first 
aid volunteer workforce (eg, wound care and infection 
control) as they provide most of the care. There was also 
an added benefit of senior clinical advice being readily 
available if required.
The ambulance vehicles which were proving hard to 
resource and were of very restricted use were discon-
tinued. Attendance of a London Ambulance Service 
officer at each match who has a primary role to manage 
a major incident was continued and is fulfilled by a small 
number of local officers to increase team cohesion.
The Green Guide minimum staffing shown in figure 1B 
was replaced by two registered healthcare professionals 
and a medical coordinator (also a healthcare profes-
sional) per game, an ambulance service officer and 
one first aider per thousand spectators as illustrated in 
figure 1C. According to previous data, a crowd of >12 000 
is more likely to require an emergency response,9 thus 
for games where the expected spectators exceed 12 000 
additional resources are present, for example, extra 
paramedics.
The stakeholder group overseeing change consisted 
of healthcare professionals, first aid volunteers, London 
Ambulance Service, representatives from the supporter’s 
club and other stakeholders such as club staff. All deci-
sions/changes were reviewed by the statutory local Safety 
Advisory Group which is the group given responsibility 
for safety including issuing of the safety licence.
The service applied for and was granted membership 
of the British Association of Immediate Care (BASICS) 
which provided a framework for standards of education 
and guidance on evidence-based care as well as equip-
ment usage.
Measures and analysis
Observational longitudinal data were used. The period 
assessed consisted of 14 consecutive football league 
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Figure 1 (A) The medical service prior to the 2008/2009 season and post the 2009/2010 season showing the changes 
implemented. (B) Organisation of the Green Guide service. (C) Organisation of the British Association of Immediate Care 
(BASICS) service. *Accountable officer for service; ^accountable officer in event of major incident.
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Figure 2 Total episodes of care delivered per 1000 attendances in the preimplementation and postimplementation phase.
seasons at Millwall FC (preimplementation of changes, 
seasons 2002/2003 to 2008/2009 where care was deliv-
ered according to the Green Guide guidance and postim-
plementation seasons 2009/2010 to 2015/2016 where 
care was delivered within the new framework). A prospec-
tive observational study was carried out which employed 
consecutive sampling to collect data. In the 2009–2010 
season, the new workforce model was introduced and so 
there is a focus in the presentation of data of two phases 
using descriptive statistics.
The primary outcome measures were usage, skill mix 
and clinical outcomes. In order to collect the data, an 
instrument was designed which was used to record each 
episode of care, consultation or advice given in the 
regular football league season (ie, not including playoff or 
exhibition games). This instrument has been previously 
described9 and, briefly, collected data on the following: 
age, sex, postcode (or area of residence), reason for 
attendance, category (staff or spectator), presenting signs 
and symptoms, diagnosis, treatment given and outcome. 
In addition, the skill mix involved in each episode was 
also recorded. All users of the service were eligible for 
inclusion in the evaluation.
The data were recorded by the healthcare provider 
and collated at the end of each match by the medical 
coordinator.
Data on workforce retention and volunteer workforce 
satisfaction were also examined.
All data were analysed for activity using an Excel work-
sheet. As the study design is one of activity/needs anal-
ysis, statistical manipulation offers limited benefit and so 
is limited to descriptive statistics.
results
A total of 981 episodes of care were recorded over the 
duration of the evaluation (392 for the period 2002/2003 
to 2008/2009 and 589 for the period 2009/2010 to 
2015/2016). Overall the usage of the service increased in 
the phase post implementation. This was 0.174–0.33 per 
1000 attendances in the preimplementation phase and 
0.284–0.452 in the postimplementation phase. This can 
be seen in figure 2.
consultation type
Over the entire time period, 977 episodes of care were 
characterised as either pre-existing or new conditions. 
55.5% of the episodes of care were classified as pre-ex-
isting with the remaining 44.5% being new conditions. 
Across the 14 seasons, the proportion of presentations for 
pre-existing conditions ranged from 32% to 72%. This is 
shown in figure 3A.
Age of users
The age of the user (either the actual age or a general 
category of adult or child (16 and under)) presenting was 
recorded in 753 episodes of care. In the remaining 228 
presentations, age was either not recorded or the user did 
not wish to give an age. Of the 711 users who gave an 
exact age, the youngest was aged 1 and the oldest 92 with 
a mean age 32.
Gender of users
The gender of the service users was recorded for 813 
episodes of care. On 168 occasions, the gender was not 
recorded. The percentage of users by gender was 35% 
female and 64% male.
user profile
Users were categorised as ‘public’ (ie, supporters), ‘MFC 
steward’, ‘MFC staff’ (including catering staff, office 
staff), ‘police’ or ‘player’. The user profile was recorded 
for 954 episodes of care with 27 episodes where the user 
profile was either not recorded or unknown. Figure 3B 
shows the % users for each category in total and for the 
2002–2008 and 2009–2015 seasons.
reason for presentation
In total, 981 episodes of care were categorised as either 
‘medical’ or ‘trauma’. Over the entire study, 57.2% of 
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Figure 3 (A) Presentations of new and pre-existing conditions—every season saw a significant proportion of presentations 
from patients with pre-existing conditions. (B) % profile of service users for the total study, 2002–2008 and 2009–2015.
the episodes were categorised as medical with 42.3% 
categorised as trauma. Between 2002 and 2008, 62.6% 
of episodes of care were characterised as ‘medical’, with 
the remaining 37.4% being ‘trauma’. From 2009 to 2015, 
52.7% of episodes of care were categorised as ‘medical’ 
with 47.3% being ‘trauma’.
skill mix utilisation
The skill mix of the medical team was logged for each 
episode of care. For the 2002/2003 season, the catego-
ries ‘first aider’ and ‘health professional’ (ie, nurse, para-
medic or doctor) were used. Following this season, more 
detailed categories were used with ‘first aider’, ‘nurse’, 
‘doctor’, ‘paramedic’ and ‘carer’ being used. If more 
than one group was involved in care, this was recorded as 
such (eg, ‘first aider plus nurse’). Results are presented 
as a percentage of the total number of episodes for each 
period.
Over the entire study, 855 episodes of care were 
recorded (267 for the period 2002–2008 and 588 for the 
period 2009–2015). On 126 occasions, the skill mix was 
not recorded.
First aiders alone accounted for 45% of the total 
recorded episodes of care (45.3% for the period 2002–
2008 and 44.9% for the period 2009–2015). First aider 
plus nurse accounted for 21.4% of the total episodes of 
care (19.9% for the period 2002–2008 and 26.9% for the 
period 2009–2015). Nine per cent of episodes of care 
were provided by a nurse alone (10.1% for the period 
2002–2008 and 8.5% for the period 2009–2015). First 
aider, nurse and doctor dealt with 7.8% of the episodes 
of care (9.4% for the period 2002–2008 and 7.1% for 
the period 2009–2015). First aider and doctor accounted 
for 6.4% of episodes (3% for the period 2002–2008 and 
8% for the period 2009–2015). All other combinations 
accounted for <2% each of the episodes of care. Figure 4 
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Figure 4 Skill mix utilisation recorded for each episode of care for the total period (855 episodes), 2002–2008 seasons (267 
episodes) and 2009–2015 seasons (588 episodes). Figures are the total % over the period for each category. DR, crowd doctor; 
FA, first aider; HP, health professional; N, nurse; P, paramedic.
shows the skill utilisation for the total study, the 2002–
2008 seasons and the 2009–2015 seasons.
Looking at overall involvement in care, first aiders were 
involved either alone or with other health professionals 
in 87.7% of the episodes of care (85.2% for the period 
2002–2008 and 89% for the period 2009–2015). Nurses 
were involved in 44.4% of episodes (44.2% for the period 
2002–2008 and 45.4% for the period 2009–2015) while 
doctors were involved in 17.8% (18.3% for the period 
2002–2008 and 17.6% for the period 2009–2015).
Outcome of episode
The outcome of each episode of care was divided into a 
number of categories:
 ► Stay: Patient stayed in the ground (ie, returned to the 
game).
 ► Stay+30: Patient stayed in the ground after being in 
the first aid room for 30 min or longer.
 ► Stay + general practitioner (GP): Patient stayed in the 
ground but was advised to visit a GP later.
 ► Home+GP: Patient went home immediately after 
the consultation and was advised to visit a GP later if 
appropriate.
 ► Minor Injuries Unit (MIU): Patient was sent to a local 
MIU (an urgent care/walk in facility).
 ► Hospital: Patient was sent to a local A&E department 
via an ambulance.
 ► Custody: Patient was taken into custody by the Metro-
politan Police due to safeguarding issues.
Figure 5A shows the outcome of each episode of care. 
The most common outcome for both time periods exam-
ined was ‘stay’ with >70% of episodes coming into this 
category. Overall a downward trend in referral to hospital 
was seen in the postimplementation phase (figure 5B).
There were no deaths in the study.
health promotion activities
The change in workforce and closer relationship with 
colleagues and supporters enabled several health promo-
tion activities to take place working in partnership with 
local services and charities. This included prostate cancer 
awareness, ‘fit club’; a programme of activity and healthy 
eating, awareness of local bowel cancer screening services 
(as part of the national screening programme), men’s 
health checks and offers from local smoking cessation 
services.29
Workforce
Informal feedback is positive, and volunteer experience 
surveys have improved with biannual satisfaction scores 
improving. However, these are administered and reported 
centrally through the charitable body that supplies volun-
teers and the raw data were not available for analysis.
Although there was no formal evaluation of this (eg, 
satisfaction surveys), retention of the local volunteer and 
healthcare professional workforce is high—97% in the 
postimplementation phase compared with 54% in the 
preimplementation phase with very low turnover of staff 
and no attrition of the healthcare professional staff at all.
DIscussIOn
Overall the new workforce model has met increased 
service demands while reducing the number of refer-
rals to acute care. Significantly the new model uses 
expertise of different professional groups and involves 
the first aid workforce in more complex care and key 
decision-making, It also engaged in health promotion 
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Figure 5 (A) Outcome of episodes of care. (B) Trend in hospital referrals by year. GP, general practitioner; MIU, Minor Injuries 
Unit.
activities and forging a closer working relationship with 
the services stakeholders.
There have been a number of incidents where the resil-
ience of the new model has been tested, for example, with 
multiple concurrent casualties or serious and life-threat-
ening incidents.30 The response to such incidents has 
been swift (<3 min) with good outcomes at scene, the 
patients all being transferred to hospital alive. Such inci-
dents are unusual and infrequent, requiring a combi-
nation of fundamental and advanced skills that bring 
together the full strength of the whole medical team.
The majority of the patients seen are of low acuity, the 
greater majority of presentations arise from pre-existent 
conditions. A significantly lesser workload arises from 
emergent illness or trauma, which replicates previous 
findings.9–12
In terms of leadership, the assumption that leader-
ship comes from only one professional group18 was 
never questioned. This evaluation demonstrates that 
wider groups of professionals other than just physi-
cians can lead effectively and safely in these services; 
the service at Millwall and leadership of the medical 
advisory group is an example of this. It is necessary to 
consider the need for consistency and the attributes 
required in these services over and above the tech-
nical, and move to an employment model in which 
technical skills, experience, knowledge and leader-
ship qualities become paramount requirements.
Only autonomous registered, regulated professionals 
are employed (ie, nurse practitioners who prescribe and 
often hold the Diploma in Immediate Care); no associate 
professionals are employed at the time of writing. Thus, 
decision-making is not an issue within the service as each 
group has its own code of conduct and adherence to best 
practice is a condition both of employment and within 
the ‘red rules’. All professional members of the team have 
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appraisals and those registered with the Nursing Medical 
Council (NMC) or General Medical Council (GMC) are 
additionally subject to those regulatory bodies’ revalida-
tion requirements.
The increased workload since the introduction of the 
new workforce arrangements may be directly related to 
the new arrangements. Williams31 posits that increased 
presentation rates reflect the visibility and accessibility of 
the medical services themselves. At Millwall the involve-
ment of stakeholder groups and onward engagement 
with them, combined with joint participation in health 
promotion ventures at the stadium, may be influential 
in the increased presentation rate through increased 
visibility. There is evidence that crowd size in itself is 
not a predictor of workload.10 11 32 Other studies show 
phenomenon such as an association between pitch-side 
performance and risk of cardiovascular events in the local 
population.33
Although this was a local evaluation, there is transfer-
able learning to other similar environments outside of 
football. A flexible cohesive workforce defined by skill 
and driven by demand offers many advantages for all 
stakeholders including members of the workforce. Cohe-
sive teams have familiarity with each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses and can feel less coercive where ‘expert power’ 
is shared and the voices of stakeholders are heard.34
A flexible workforce open to other registered health-
care professionals such as nurses, doctors and paramedics 
with various skills and attributes allowed the team to opti-
mise the availiability of professional skill and range of 
care offered. Different professional groups can perform 
at this level and may have attributes that are more suited 
to this environment. It is an important facet of the work-
force model within this discussion that the registered 
healthcare professionals used are wider in scope than 
those within The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds.5 
By including those with expertise in minor injuries and 
primary care, the resilience of the medical team has been 
optimised. This is reflected in the overall and enduring 
reduced referrals to external sources of care. The fact 
that at least one of the registered healthcare professionals 
at each match has experience of high-acuity prehospital 
care and is minimally qualified to the level of the Pre-Hos-
pital Emergency Care Course35 provides clinical expertise 
in the (rare) event of high-acuity incidents.
cOnclusIOn
The new workforce model has met increased service 
demands while reducing the number of referrals to acute 
care. It involves the first aid workforce in more complex 
care and key decision-making and provides a flexible 
registered healthcare professional team to optimise the 
skill mix of the team.
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